Why existential intelligence doesn’t quite make the grade
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All philosophical discussion, even the most radical attempt to begin all over again, is pervaded by traditional concepts and thus by traditional horizons and traditional angles of approach. (Heidegger, 1982, 22)

In the theory of Multiple Intelligences, Howard Gardner has contributed to a broadening of conceptions of schooling beyond a concern with the abstractly academic, by mapping intelligence in territory uncharted by ‘g.’ Yet, while proffering a more pluralistic understanding of knowing, Gardner excludes moral and spiritual intelligences from the array, and only reluctantly accords existential intelligence associate status. This proscription of normativity severely limits the value of Gardner’s theory for what truly ails us in an era of hypermodernity.

I commenced with the quotation from Heidegger as a counterpoint to Gardner’s claim that the theory of Multiple Intelligences is “a new definition of human nature,” on a par with those offered by figures such as Socrates and Freud (Gardner, 1999, 44). This is evidently more than a project of mere empirical psychology (if there ever is such a thing). It is a proposal for a philosophical anthropology, and it is necessarily laden with normative implications.

Some of these implications are explicit in Gardner’s second major claim, which matches the first in tone and scope: the prophecy that how best to realize our potential as this kind of being—“a species exhibiting several intelligences”—is the great challenge we face in the new millennium (Gardner, 1999, 45). “Deciding how to deploy one’s intelligences is a question of values, not computational power,” however. While Gardner affirms that both intelligences and morality must be nurtured, it is “a grave error to confuse the two.” Instead, “we must strive to … yoke them both together as virtues” (p. 46, cf. p. 4). What remains problematic is how two such disparate realms could ever be equally yoked. The underlying implication is that the realm of values is ultimately beyond the scope of intelligent scrutiny. But if existential ability is the capacity to address fundamental questions of human existence, these questions concern not only an individual’s and a culture’s core values but their actual behavior. The answers to these questions impinge very directly on attitudes toward the pursuit of justice and the use or avoidance of violence in service of individual or national goals.

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1 Though Gardner qualifies this statement with the phrase, “cognitively speaking”, it is nonetheless “an account of human cognition in its fullness…”; when favored definitions of humanness include “rational animal” and “homo sapiens”, this may not be much of a limitation at all, and Gardner’s pretensions are evident from the company he chooses to keep.

2 Gardner himself celebrates the breadth of disciplinary resources on which he has drawn to establish the criteria for an intelligence, suggesting that these sources are probably beyond the competence of many critics to evaluate (Gardner, 1999, 41).

3 An appeal to virtues might be promising, however, in light of recent discussion of a virtue ethics and epistemology.
Taken together, Gardner’s two claims point to the paradox intrinsic to his project: although he professes that MI theory has no logical entailments for educational practice, that it rests with educators to determine what implications there might be (Gardner, 1999, 144), there is no doubt that Gardner rests his hopes for the future on schools that will adopt his “new definition of human nature.”4 All that schools have to do is to provide the missing values. Gardner’s is a tripartite anthropology: he supplies the empirical description of an organism capable of intelligent action, while society and its educators prescribe the third, normative dimension. This is a free-floating dimension, however, not grounded in our full human bodiliness.

In his critique of progressive education, Kieran Egan sets out to turn on its head the paradigm with which Gardner operates. In underscoring that what is at issue is “not facts but ways of seeing” (Egan, 2002, 158), and that our ideal of the educated person requires “the value-saturated business of sorting out what you think is the best way of being human, the best way to live” (p. 182), he may seem to be echoing Gardner. But he goes much further, questioning the way in which much educational research has been conducted, and challenging the very assumption that “human behavior has a nature that can be uncovered by application of scientific research” (p. 177).5 Without a rich, elaborate and comprehensive conception of the mature person, “all the research findings in the world are educationally blind, and with such a conception, it is unclear what research findings have to offer” (p. 181).6

Egan’s argument is that educational psychology is most often an analytical rather than an empirical enterprise, in which conclusions are read out of definitions while masquerading as experimental or evidence-based findings. These definitions themselves reflect philosophically loaded conceptions of personhood. Though he is not mentioned explicitly, a critique of Gardner seems to constitute a sub-text of Egan’s book, especially when one considers the extent to which Gardner’s remains a fundamentally Piagetian anthropology. For Gardner, as for Piaget, humans are biopsychological organisms capable of learning through operations on their environment.7 In other words, Gardner’s empiricist methodology, despite its avowed separation of “facts” from “values”, harbors some quite unempircist and value-laden assumptions—and necessarily so, according to critiques of empiricism post-Quine and Kuhn.

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4 He may be too modest to pontificate on pedagogy, but he most certainly wants educators to employ his theory to justify serious attention to individual differences, and to enact their curricula on a stage furnished with the props of MI, even if their performance is not scripted thereby (pp. 150-152). Particularly in a country that has chosen to construct education on the model of the sciences, with educational psychology as the paradigm foundational discipline, the biopsychological potential and computational capacities that are constitutive of his “intelligences” are the “factual material” with which educators have to work.

5 Klein (1997) similarly charges Gardner with constructing a theory that is virtually useless for educators, because of its emphasis on fixed abilities.

6 “It is only from such a conception,” Egan claims, “that we can derive educational principles” (p. 145).

7 Gardner obviously extends Piaget’s focus beyond logical operations to include a broader range of evolving computational competences.
It is not my intention to rehearse these critiques, nor those of Gardner’s employment of this methodology. While Gardner (Gardner & Connell, 2000) is skeptical, if not scornful, of philosophy, claiming that practicing scientists pay little heed to what philosophers have to say about the nature of scientific investigation, the irony is the extent to which Gardner himself is in thrall to philosophical assumptions, which I wish now to place in a larger historical context.

The prominence of epistemology in philosophy dates from the time of Descartes, whose view of reason as method framed the debates for the centuries that followed. Significantly, it was not abstract philosophical speculations that motivated him to withdraw in meditation, but the concrete context of the socio-political crucible that was post-Reformation Europe. I commence this historical excursus with a more immediate context, one that symbolizes perhaps more than any other the depths to which computational intelligence or calculative reason—intelligence as method, sundered from the normative—can sink. I refer to the Wannsee Conference in 1942, convened to map the contours of the “final solution.” It should give us pause, as Gardner (1999, 205) himself intimates, that half the participants possessed earned PhDs. And it is an irony of history that one of the participants was named Martin Luther. This observation is not gratuitous, for the roots of Gardner’s anthropological and methodological assumptions can be traced to this Luther’s namesake. As Toulmin (1992) has demonstrated, it is Luther who largely established the context from which emerged the Cartesian constructs that frame the modern era.

Throughout the mediaeval period, a view of the person as threefold—sensitive, intellective, and deliberative—prevailed, with the deliberative seen to be as constitutive of humanness as the other dimensions. In Thomism, the Aristotelian version gained prominence, though transformed by the Augustinian concept of the will. According to Aristotle, reasoning was of two kinds, one taking abstract universals as its subject matter, and another focusing on practice. Phronesis, practical reasoning embedded in praxis, was not the mere technical implementation of ends prescribed by theoretical reason. Rather, practical reasoning begins with the intuition of value, ultimately, that of the “good life” (eudaimonia). Deliberating on the steps required to actualize that value, we discern what is possible for us here and now, we decide for it, and then act (cf. Garrison, 1997, xvii-ixx; MacIntyre, 1984, 161-62). Despite the apparent similarities between this twofold division and that of Gardner between intelligences and values, phronesis, while not detached from but attached to values, is obviously also an intelligent action. It is as we habituate ourselves to acting in ways that are proper to our humanity that we acquire the virtues.

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8 The underdetermination of theory by data and the theory-ladenness of observation are well-worn tools in the dismantling of empiricism. For a critique of Gardner from the perspective of naturalistic coherentism, see Nicholas Allix (2000).
9 Though Gardner would no doubt be scornful of this approach as well, it might assuage him somewhat that Piaget regarded himself as a philosopher rather than a psychologist, as one engaged in the project of genetic epistemology, though, no doubt, an “epistemology naturalized”. 
It is no hyperbole to say that Luther abhorred Aristotle: he likened him to the devil incarnate, and regarded the notion that moral virtues can be acquired “the worst enemy of grace” (cit. Painter, 1999, 73). The Augustinian revision allowed an explanation for acts of bad faith, wherein a sinful will prevents humans from acting on what they know to be right. Luther went further: sin poisons the ability of the will to direct reason beyond what MacIntyre calls the merely calculative, and Gardner describes as “computational.” This severed the connection between practical reason and any first principle or telos. Reason may be applied to secular affairs, but is useless when it comes to distinguishing ultimate human purposes or what is truly of value. The latter lies in the hands of God alone, as a gift of his grace (Painter, 1999, 71-76).

It is thus that Luther prepared the soil for the dichotomy between facts and values that came to characterize modernity. This was a religious and philosophical construct, a two-realm view of life—“It is not impossible to be a prince and a Christian and a prince, although it is a rare thing and beset with many difficulties” (Luther, 1962, 118)—that may be traced through Immanuel Kant and Auguste Comte into the twentieth century. Though Gardner’s allusion is evidently literary rather than theological, he yet opines, “We probably will never re-create an Eden where intellectual and ethical values commingle, and we should recognize the these virtues can be separate. Indeed … are often all too remote from one another (Gardner, 1999, 211).

Kant completed the foundations of modern approaches to ethics by seeking universal laws that were independent of local, historical, and cultural contexts. As pietistic Lutheran, Kant had in mind a characteristically Lutheran move, that of demarcating the realm of natural reason in order to make way for that of faith. His intention was to safeguard the role of the latter, when instead his successors ensured its irrelevance. Questions of value are subsumed in epistemology, a disembodied ethics of abstract duties, and values as universal, nomological principles disappear. The hegemony of theory over practice reaches its apogee in twentieth century positivism, where “facts” and “values” were not only radically dichotomized, but all “values-talk” was construed as nonsensical.

While the chimerical character of this autonomous rationalism has been recognized by many in the postmodern era, this is by no means universal, as Gardner himself evinces. For him, our world is one in which the “division between the ‘true’ and the ‘good’ has been entrenched… the fact that many other cultures meld the realms of knowledge and virtue leaves most contemporary Westerners untouched, if not bewildered” (Gardner, 1999, 68). As for Luther and Kant, the way to avoid “epistemological problems” is to

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10 Whereas for Plato, not to do the right thing was proof that one did not know what the right thing was, for knowledge necessarily issued in virtue. Aristotle accepted that someone could know what was right but still not restrain himself from doing wrong, which he explained (lacking as he did the biblical understanding of the will) in terms of akrasia or incontinence (Aristotle, 1953, Bk 7).

11 Luther’s nominalism may also have been at work here, because in Kant’s “Copernican revolution” it is the mind’s categories that make experience possible. The Kantian “categorical imperative”—“Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law”—is an imposition of moral order by the knowing subject. John Hare has observed that Kant inherited the categorical imperative from Luther through his own pietist pastor (Hare, 2005); for Kant’s Christian intentions, see Hare (1997).
restrict a definition of the intelligences “to the processing of ‘contents in the world’,” (p. 204) leaving the noumenal, we might say (as nineteenth century philosophers indeed did), to look after itself. But, as we will see, Gardner’s intelligences, along with everything else in human life, are necessarily contextualized in cultures and traditions. Values pervade life in its entirety, and are a matter of personal and communal standpoint or perspective. The irony is, then, that Gardner’s methodology is itself rooted in a religious and philosophical tradition, which is not merely the world seen, but seen as—“not facts but ways of seeing” (Egan, 2002, 158). It is a

This historical overview provides the grounds for an explanation of one of the most puzzling features of Gardner’s theory: a self-referential incoherence in relation to values. How is it that Gardner appears blind to his equivocation over values? The roots of this lie deeper than the methods of theoretical analysis, in cultural assumptions of the kind Gardner himself identifies in his just-quoted reference to “bewilderment”. This dichotomy between personal values and those he identifies as socio-cultural, between the realm of freedom and what is naturally given—“fractionating [intelligence] … along the lines that nature intended,” without it being “confounded with other virtues” (Gardner, 1999, 115)—is a split which demands critique.  

Gardner’s current definition of an intelligence is: “a biopsychological potential to process information that can be activated in a cultural setting to solve problems or create products that are of value in a culture” (Gardner, 1999, 33-34). Branton Shearer (2004), chair of the AERA Multiple Intelligences SIG, identifies three distinguishing features in Gardner’s “deceptively simple yet profoundly different definition” of intelligence:

1. Intelligence is the ability to solve problems….
2. … Intelligence includes the abilities to create products and to provide valuable services.
3. Intelligence … includes the materials and the values of the situation where and how the thinking occurs. The availability of appropriate materials and the values of any particular context or culture will thus have a significant impact on the degree to which specific abilities will be activated, developed, or discouraged.

Shearer’s second and third points make explicit reference to values, and I would argue that the first depends on an implicit value element, as the determination that a problem has been solved is an evaluation or judgment that can only in rare instances be handled computationally. Yet Gardner affirms that in his work, he adhered to the long-standing disjunction between description and prescription and regarded intelligences as decidedly ‘morally neutral’ or ‘value free’…. whether people adhere to their culture’s value system or go on to revise it … is a personal decision, not an exercise of that computational system I call (an) intelligence. (Gardner, 1999, 67-68)

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12 Gardner does at one point identify morals as “a subspecies of a cultural value system” (Gardner, 1999, 67), which hints at the difficulties with a rigorous dichotomy that I will explore below.
13 Shearer is referring to an earlier, though not significantly different, definition to the one I have quoted (Gardner, 1993).
The charitable interpretation of this paradox is that the references to “values” in Gardner’s definition are intended to identify empirical descriptions of sociological facts. They are then merely cultural preferences, nothing more. This begs the question, however, assuming that there is another, more tendentious realm of “values,” in distinction from what people happen to value. But one never confronts values as other than cultural preferences, in culturally instantiated form.

The distinction that Gardner wishes to draw is between moral (and religious or spiritual) values and other realms of value. “Existential intelligence can be manifested by anyone who exhibits facility, clarity, or depth in thinking about ‘ultimate’ issues, whether the thoughts are positive or negative, moral or immoral” (Gardner, 1999, 69).

But, as I have said, the question is whether such a distinction can be drawn at all. In the first instance, I would argue that the pluralistic intention of Gardner’s project would be more fully realized if he were to recognize explicitly the pervasiveness of value or normativity that is implicit in his portrayal of the intelligences. In the passage just quoted, “facility, clarity, [and] depth in thinking” are normative criteria. They identify what counts as good thinking (existential or otherwise). “Good” here is certainly not a moral term, but a placeholder for “logical.” It is nonetheless an evaluative one. For “facility” and “clarity” point to logical processes, to adept adherence to identity and non-contradiction, etc., to fundamental logical values or norms. “Depth” alludes to the less formally logical elements of thought, for any concrete act of thinking is always a matter of what range of evidence is brought into purview and what weight is accorded to the various factors that have been assembled, in relation to one another. The question is whether we hold ourselves or others responsible for thinking well or poorly, and we most evidently do. To proceed characteristically in an illogical manner is to too often mandate actions that are more or less destructive of human flourishing. To agree that this is not a moral lapse is to speak to intention, and the road may be paved with many good ones; but even when one commences with accurate premises and good intentions, faulty thinking will generate false conclusions and bad outcomes. It is to this kind of normativity that I take it Gardner alludes when he says, “Most outstanding creators have a strongly developed sense of propriety about permissible and impermissible moves within their domain”, although “This terrain is not, strictly speaking, moral…” (Gardner, 1999, 73). The whole scientific enterprise, it may be argued, relies on the sense of “propriety” articulated in the superempirical norms or virtues of comprehensiveness, simplicity, consistency, fecundity, conservativeness and learnability (cf. Evers & Lakomski, 1991).

Gardner suggests that possibly the most significant conceptual advance made by MI theory is the shift in how assessment of intelligence is to be approached, along with the distinctions he draws between intelligences, domains, and fields: “intelligences are

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14 Gardner (1999, 67fn) comments, “Of course, I deem as intelligences those abilities that are valued within a culture, but I do not myself pass judgment on the validity of those evaluations.”

15 Values are only ever encountered experientially, and experience is always culturally shaped. This does not imply that one cannot transcend—or revise, as Gardner says—a culture’s value system, only that the materials with which one or, more usually, a group, has to work, are derived from the traditioned environment. Values do not float free in some transcendent realm.
always expressed in the context of specific tasks, domains, and disciplines” and can only be assessed in such situations (Gardner, 1993, xx, 69). While sensitivity to pitch relations in auditory input might be a core biological component of musical intelligence, the development of this ability is possible only in culturally developed contexts. And these contexts provide the criteria by which, at the basest level, one distinguishes music from cacophony, singing from speech. There is no predetermined limit, because music is a cultural construction, but an evaluation will be made. Does throat-singing, yodeling, raga or rap count as music? And what are the criteria for better or worse, more or less accomplished performances or compositions in each of these genres?16

Domains and fields are never monolithic even within a culture, let alone across cultures. The notion that “received English” constitutes the gold standard has currency within only a limited area of the English-speaking world; the notion that English should function as the international language invites opposition from others besides the French. Values are inevitably contested, in whichever socio-cultural domain one identifies. And it is for this reason that Gardner would today, more so than in his previous work, “underscore the importance of assuming a cross-cultural perspective” (Gardner, 1999, 38)

In reflecting on the status of a moral intelligence, Gardner (1999, 69) suggests that:

The key is whether one can think of a skill in the moral realm, independent of the particular uses to which that skill might be put…. When Goleman speaks about a certain set of recommended behaviors, he leaves the realm of intelligence, in a strictly scholarly sense, and enters the separate spheres of values and social policy.

Given the role that “recommended behaviors” and “a sense of propriety” play in all cultural domains, and that an intelligence can only be activated within a domain, I conclude that Gardner’s exclusion of existential and moral intelligences on the grounds that they deal with the realm of values is the result of a methodological proscription which to him is as natural as the air that we breathe (as Roszak (1968, 216-17) once observed of the spirit of objectivity), but which is itself a value-laden framing of world and person.

Intelligences are not only potentials, but abilities that are culturally activated artifacts. In other words, they have to do with action, which is not knowledge plus values but embodied action of the whole person. An intelligence does not act, a person does.17 And we find the perfect illustration of this in Gardner himself. It is because of his practical interest—a concern for what values will be instantiated in educational practice—that Gardner is so cavalier about admission to the MI club. He acknowledges that the decision

16 How does one distinguish the babbling of a child from talking, or that of a barbarian from civilized Greek? Or when is one speaking French, or speaking it well or poorly? What constitutes bodily ability in contrast to lack of coordination? What makes the hop, step and jump worthy of inclusion in the Olympics, let alone worthy of a gold medal? To which inner emotional states do I attend, and what weighting (value) do I give them? How much attention do I give to a person’s gestures and mood, and in what way should they be taken into account in how I deal with that person?
17 Hence, Gardner’s (1993, 241, 268, 276, 296-298) musings as to whether a sense of self acts as a “second-level regulator,” though he rejects the need for an executive function.
in favor of eight (more or less) intelligences is determined by a prudential (rather than arbitrary) decision about how fine-grained the analysis is to be (Gardner, 1999, 103). Theories are only learnable if they are presented at an appropriate level of generality. In other words, practical reason or phronesis enters into the heart of Gardner’s theoretical activity. His admission of a naturalist intelligence by a somewhat facetious “performative speech act” (“I dub thee…” or, “Gardner said, ‘Let there be …, and there was ….’”) suggests the outcome not of the finely tuned empirical scientific process Gardner elsewhere purports to follow, but a pragmatic judgment.18

In proposing a theory in which the cards are dealt finally by deliberative judgment, Gardner outruns that theory’s epistemological resources. Though he suggests that the ability to make a judicious decision is central to the intelligences (p. 136), this capability smacks more of wisdom than of computational competence or calculative reasoning. Further, it is instructive that Gardner tells us that he began his search for different kinds of talent not by looking for general human qualities, but by examining outstanding individuals. He conceived his intelligences in the context of ideal types, representing desirable (because culturally valued) end-states—“a socially recognized and valued role that appears to rely heavily on a particular intellectual capacity” (Gardner, 1999, 48). So significant is this to Gardner, that it constitutes one of his eight criteria for an intelligence (p. 38). Why are expert performances admirable? Because they contribute to human flourishing, not merely of the individual possessor, but to the culture which they help to shape. They add value to human life. When Gardner is constrained to identify educational goals which MI might most usefully serve, the first of these is to help students achieve such valued end-states (pp. 166-7).

While Gardner does not acknowledge an aesthetic intelligence, he does claim that a “multiple intelligences school” will be one that is necessarily rich in artistic activities (Gardner, 1999, 108, 148). Dewey (and subsequently, Maxine Greene and Elliot Eisner) has a similarly high regard for the role of the arts in learning, for “in art, knowledge is transformed; it becomes something more than knowledge because it is merged with non-intellectual elements to form an experience worthwhile as an experience” (Dewey, 1980, 290). Gardner admits the imperative of “something more” than the computational abilities of the intelligences; perhaps Dewey also offers a clue to a more integral view of the person, and an acknowledgement of the comprehensive reach of values, when he says, “Were art an acknowledged power in human association and … were morals understood to be identical with every aspect of value that is shared in experience, the

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18 In considering the status of spiritual intelligence, it is instructive that Gardner is concerned not to have this theory hijacked by the lunatic fringe, the likes of Jim Jones and David Koresh. If how the intelligences are used is an extra-intelleligential matter, one can expect the same lunatic fringe to arise in other areas, without thereby jeopardizing the status of the intelligence. It was alchemists seeking to turn lead into gold who yet laid the foundations for modern chemistry. The great preponderance of physicists working for the military defence complex may from some respectable points of view be considered just as lunatic. But his very identification of some values as less acceptable than others suggests that there is a realm of rational (though hopefully, not rationalistic) discourse available to assist us in sifting through competing claims, in the realm of overt values as much as in the realm of covert ones.
‘problem’ of the relations of art and morals would not exist” (p. 348). I take it that Dewey here is saying that what we normally restrict to the moral is in fact the normative dimension of all experience. And I see an implicit acknowledgement of this in the passage quoted earlier, in which Gardner indicates that thoughts will be either negative or positive, moral or immoral (Gardner, 1999, 69); that is to say, which Gardner does not, they are never “uncharged,” non-directional normativity, never a-moral. 19

While purporting to eschew values, Gardner can only be consistent in this by restricting the conception of values to specified dimensions in life, viz, the ethical and the spiritual. But it is not so much the content of these potential intelligences that is at issue for Gardner, it is the lack of consensus about what values obtain, “widely discrepant views of what is good and bad, and why” (Gardner, 1999, 205). Surely, as I have sought to illustrate, this lack of consensus is ubiquitous across all domains of human culture, and the criterion of consistency ought to apply equally to each. 20 It is disingenuous of Gardner to imply that the differences between the American clinician and tribal shaman in the domain of healthcare or healing are not of a similar order to the differences between a Catholic ethicist and a utilitarian in that of morality (p. 38). His rejection of normativity in intelligence is also despite his conviction that ethical concerns are central to the study of leadership and what constitutes “good work” (Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi, & Damon, 2001), the sources of those ideal human types that initially framed his heuristic.

As I have earlier implied, no values are “absolute.” Indeed, the notion of the absolute is not only unnecessary, it is foreign to a truly pluralistic (and ecological21) perspective, in which all things are related or relative to other persons and to all else that there is. 22 That

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19 Without “something more”—and I do not suggest this is art—Gardner’s intelligences are no advance over another significant and relatively recent attempt to fund a pluralistic view of human knowing in education: Paul Hirst’s “forms of knowledge” thesis (Hirst, 1974). For Gardner’s intelligences, like Hirst’s forms are ultimately logical-conceptual domains. “The existence of a moral intelligence rests on the existence of an identifiable moral domain” (Gardner, 1999, 69). “It makes sense to think of a realm as ‘intellectual’, as the seat of an ‘intelligence’, only after that realm’s essence has successfully been captured” (p. 76). This use of the term “intellectual” reveals Gardner’s hand: a domain has to be characterized intellectually, i.e. in logical, theoretical and systematic terms, for an intelligence’s credentials to be established.

20 In considering the status of spiritual intelligence, it is instructive that Gardner is concerned not to have his theory hijacked by the “lunatic fringe”, the likes of Jim Jones and David Koresh. If how the intelligences are used is an extra-intellectual matter, one can expect the same lunatic fringe to arise in other areas, without thereby jeopardizing the status of the intelligence. It was alchemists seeking to turn lead in to gold who yet laid the foundations for modern chemistry. The great preponderance of physicists working for the military defense complex may from some respectable points of view be considered just as lunatic. But his very identification of some values as less acceptable than others suggests that there is a realm of rational (though hopefully, not rationalistic) discourse available to assist us in sifting through competing claims, in the realm of overt values as much as in the realm of covert ones.

21 Although this would be one of my favored terms, it is not an imposition on Gardner, who states that “Education in our time should provide the basis for enhanced understanding of our several worlds—the physical world, the biological world, the world of human beings, the world of human artifacts, and the world of the self” (Gardner, 1999, 158). Nel Noddings’ (1992) prescriptions for an alternative model of schooling oriented to “centers of care” also resonates with this perspective.

22 This is not to deny structural constancy, or the abiding validity of norms such as love, justice, mercy, peace etc. As Paddy Walsh (1993) says, it is a condition of us having values that there is something of
values are only “occasionally and partially experienced” should be no impediment to the “ideal … of an environment in which all things conspire to the perfecting and sustaining” of these values (Dewey, 1980, 185). There would then be no need to bind intelligences and values together in virtues, for both would be seen to emerge from virtuous character in integral relation with a value-imbued environment.

“Something more than knowledge”—more than computational intelligence—is necessary for addressing concerns of peace and justice, and all the other values always only partially experienced. This “something more” will not be a set of disconnected ends floating above technical rationality, but the values for universal human flourishing which are intrinsic to ecologically sensitive living, to what MacIntyre regards as authentic human practices or Dewey as truly worthwhile experience. While the separation of fact and value might yet be, for some, epistemologically as well as politically correct, the presumed repudiation of values will actually issue in uncritical acceptance of values communally embedded, even if not as crude as, “My country, right or wrong.” These values must be surfaced in public and other systems of schooling if reason is not merely to serve universal value, but to be transmuted into wise living.

Gardner’s “new definition of human nature, cognitively speaking” (1999, 44), is embedded in a very old definition. While seeking to restrict himself to the “factual,” Gardner has projected a much more comprehensive view of what it means to be human. And, like Luther, he can do no other; he must take a stand on ultimate questions of value, he must act according to his own wisdom, impelled as he is by the hope that “we may discover why we must join forces, in a complementary but synergistic way, to make sure that Nature and Culture survive for future generations” (p. 219). “Facts,” after all, are made—manu-fact-ured—not given.

The issue is not whether I disagree with Gardner in his ultimate goals, but whether MI theory provides the necessary resources for their achievement. Despite the apparent fecundity in Gardner’s proliferation of intelligences, his is an attenuated view of

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23 For Dewey, experience is a doing and an undergoing, and values are as much undergone as they are ‘done.’

24 The allusion to Luther’s oft-quoted but apocryphal exclamation, “Here I stand, I can do no other,” is no doubt evident.

25 If Gardner, as philosopher, were more attentive to philosophical developments, he would be aware that the dominance of epistemology has succumbed to an axiological turn, a turn to the values for living (Sandbothe, 2004; Taylor, 1995, 1-19). As Richard Shusterman comments, ‘Wittgenstein’s disrespect for mere academic philosophizing stems from a view he shared with Dewey and Foucault, that philosophy had a much more crucial, existential task: to help us lead better lives…. Philosophy… was a life practice where theory derived its real meaning and value only in terms of the life in which it functioned….’ (Shusterman, 1997, 21). Heidegger’s emphasis on agency, Macmurray’s (1969) insistence that the ‘I do’ precedes the ‘I think,’ critical theory’s concern with emancipatory action, the concern for the Other in Derrida and Levinas, are related themes. This is a reorientation of philosophical interest from transcendent essences or clear and distinct ideas, ‘back to the rough ground.’ (This phrase is Wittgenstein’s in Philosophical investigations (cit. Dunne, 1997, xi.).)
intelligent action. A richer perspective would acknowledge the continuous requirement not merely for computation but also for judgment, the necessity of “choosing between,” as the etymology of “intelligence” reminds us. And yes, we must also choose between “facts,” discerning what is good and true. Intelligent behavior is ultimately a species of normative behavior, of recognizing what one ought to believe. Gardner assumes that some version of scientific method must be the arbiter of values, and that these must be a coordinated and coherent unitary system before they can earn the honorific of “intelligent behavior.” The notion that scientific theorizing might itself be a value-laden undertaking has eluded him. This modernist conception must give way to a postmodern celebration of a plurality of values, and respect for the various standpoints that are represented not only between, but also within, cultures. Only when we treat unequals unequally (if the ghost of Luther will forgive my appeal to Aristotle)—by responding to the identity of others in their integrity—will justice and peace be more than occasionally and partially realized.
References


